There are human beings whose intellectual power exceeds that of ordinary men. In my life, in my personal experience, there were three such men, and one of them was Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov. I was lucky enough to be his immediate pupil. He invited me to be his pupil at the third year of my being student at the Moscow University. This talk is my tribute, my homage to my great teacher.
The axioms of implications are intuitionistically appropriate. As for (AN), the axiom Ax.6 is a version of the principle of excluded middle and so is invalid intuitionstically. What is new is that Kolmogorov brings the axiom Ax.5 into question and finally rejects it because it "does not have and cannot have any intuitive foundation since it asserts something about the consequences of something impossible: we have to accept B if the true judgement A is regarded as false" (II, ?4). He explains also why this Axiom 5 was not criticized by Brouwer: the point is that this axiom "is used only in a symbolic presentation of the logic of judgments; therefore it is not affected by Brouwer's critique" (I, ?6).
So Kolmogorov rejects both Hilbert's axioms of negation and introduces his own new axiom of negation (K) (A -B)-[(A --iB) -A],
which he calls the principle of contradiction. The system of five axioms, the four axioms of implication (Al) and the axiom (K), Kolmogorov calls "the system 3".
Thus we have the historically first attempt to formalize intuitionistic logic by proposing an axiom system. "The system 93 is nowadays known as the minimal calculus and differs from Heyting's system in that the latter contains in addition to axioms (Al) and ( In the final section of his paper Kolmogorov brings into consideration also axioms of the first order predicate calculus. So it may be said that in this paper he introduced the first formalization not only for intuitionistic propositional logic but for intuitionistic predicate logic too; and the latter formalization is nothing but the minimal predicate calculus [Ch 56, Exercise 38.10] (up to the restriction to two primitive connectives), which calculus, consequently, is also due to Kolmogorov. But the formalization of intuitionistic logic and the invention of the minimal calculus are subordinate topics of Kolmogorov's paper. Let us recall its main goals: to explain why illegitimate use of the excluded middle principle goes unnoticed and does not lead to a contradiction.
In the first place, why is it unnoticeable under the presupposition, of course, that we deal with finitary judgments only? (The questionableness of application of that dubious principle to transfinite judgments is fully recognized and discussed in detail in Kolmogorov's paper.) Because, answers Kolmogorov, all the laws of classical propositional logic, including the law of the excluded middle, can be freely and legitimately used when applied to finitary judgments and, more generally, to all judgments that satisfy the principle of double negation (all finitary, as well as all negative judgments are among the latter). More precisely, Kolmogorov And if one changes the "minimal" meaning of F-to the intuitionistic one, i.e. understands F-as deducibility in the intuitionistic calculus, then one should take A v m A as the "diagnostic" formula. In a more general case let us consider some propositional (subclassical) calculus and let F-denote inference in this calculus. Now one can seek a "diagnostic" formula 3(X) such that, for any +(X1, X2,.. .), if 4 is classically provable then b(A1), b(A2), .. . F-(A1, A2,.. .), where Al,.. ., An are arbitrary constant propositions. It is not obligatory for that 3 to exist at all. But, as we just have seen, for the intuitionistic calculus 3 is X v m X, for the Kolmogorov minimal calculus 3 is i i X -+ X, and for the Johansson minimal calculus 3 is (i X -+ X) & (X v i X). And in a still more general predicate case a set of "diagnostic" 3,, should be considered, each 3,, having the form 3,(W'), where W" is an n-ary predicate variable (see [Us P1 91]).
Kolmogorov's theorem just formulated yields the following obvious corollary. COROLLARY 1. In any classical tautology in which the connectives occurring are only implication and negation let every variable be replaced by its negation; then the resulting formula is a theorem of the minimal calculus S.
And this Corollary 1 trivially implies Corollary 2, whose formulation is obtained from that of Corollary 1 by changing "negation" to "double negation". None of the corollaries are mentioned in [ANK 25], but, formulating Corollary 2, Church indicates that this result is "substantially that of Kolmogoroff" [Ch 56, Ex.26.20]. Now, in the second place, why does one never obtain a contradiction while using the law of the excluded middle? Kolmogorov answers this question by demonstrating the following effect. Had one obtained a contradiction by using the law of the excluded middle, then one could obtain another contradiction without use of this law. I believe this was chronologically the first theorem on relative consistency of a calculus, i.e. consistency of a calculus under the presumption that some other calculus is consistent. Nowadays the very method by which this relative consistency has been achieved seems quite natural and almost obvious it is the so-called embedding of one calculus, which consistency is to be checked, into another, which is presupposed to be consistent. But it was Kolgomgorov who invented this embedding method in the paper under discussion. This method manifests itself in a so-called embedding operation. Let L1 and L2 be two formal languages. A mapping of the set of formulas of L1 to the set of formulas of L2 is called, in the broadest sense, an embedding operation if it preserves some specific deduction features of formulas as, for example, the mapping ?:
or something like this. So there can be various species of embedding operations. Kolmogorov did not use the term "embedding operation", but presented chronologically the first instance of such an operation. According to Kolmogorov we consider a mapping *, which satisfies for any A The concept of a problem is one of the fundamental concepts of mathematics, and it may be that Kolmogorov was the first who took it as the subject of technical discourse. According to Kolmogorov, a The history of development of the notion of algorithm is still awaiting its historian. I believe that Emil Borel was the first who mentioned this general notion in print, back in 1912. In 1936 celebrated papers of Post, Church, Turing, and Kleene appeared. But I would like to stress that these celebrated papers, though proceeding from the most general intuitive notion of algorithm, did not set out to investigate this very notion in all its generality; they had another task-to formalize the notion of a computable function and to present some restricted class of such algorithms that simultaneously can be described with mathematical rigour and are powerful enough to ensure a computation of any function which is computable in an intuitive ( means that for any conceivable S there is an "essential part" of it, called active zone, and (6.1) the size of this zone is bounded for the given algorithm F; (6.2) the value OF(S) depends not on the argument S in the whole but only on its active zone; and (6.3) the operator OF(S) transforms only the active zone of S and does not touch the rest of S; so it can do nothing but replace the active zone by something else, this something depending only on the zone replaced.
7. The stopping signal, regarded as a function of a state, also depends on the active zone, but on nothing else.
8. The uniform boundedness of the active zone implies that for F there can be only a finite set of nonisomorphic zones, and consequently OF (as well as the stopping signal) can be described in finitary terms; and this secures the finitary character of the algorithm F. Now let us proceed to a mathematical model of these ideas. We must explain first what process states are, or should be. Of course, they are constructive objects. But what are constructive objects? As Kolmogorov believed, each state of every algorithmic process (or, what is the same, every constructive object) is an entity of the following structure. This entity consists of elements and connections; the total number of them is finite. Each connection has a fixed number of elements connected. Each element belongs to some type; each connection also belongs to some type. For every given algorithm the total number of element types and the total number of connection types are bounded. This is all quite natural and rather obvious. So a constructive object (and any algorithm process state is such an object) can be regarded as a finite first-order structure of a finite signature, the signature being fixed for every particular algorithm.
But there is a noteworthy restriction on this structure. Kolmogorov demanded not only that each connection should have a fixed number of elements involved, but that each element can be involved only in a restricted set of connections (or relation instances in the first-order structure); the upper bound of number of connections involving any given element is fixed for every algorithm.
This restriction is essential. Indeed, let us consider an algorithm using directed graphs as process states. Kolmogorov's restriction not only forbids us to use graphs with unbounded fan-out (that is, the set of edges coming out from any node) but also (and this is crucial!) forbids us to use graphs with unbounded fan-in: the number of edges entering a node must be bounded for any fixed algorithm. We shall return to this point when discussing the so-called Schbnhage machines.
It is not hard to find a geometrical presentation for Kolmogorov's idea of a constructive object. Such a presentation takes the form of a nondirected graph whose nodes (but not edges) are marked by some labels; those labels correspond not only to the element types and to the connection types but also, for any connection, to the positions of all elements incident to this connection, and, for any element, to the positions of all connections incident to this element. Then the following property of the graph necessarily holds: for any node, all nodes immediately (i.e. by only one edge) connected with it bear different labels. We require that the graph have exactly one distinguished node, called the active node.4
Now you have what is called a Kolmogorov complex: a finite undirected connected graph with labelled nodes and with the two conditions just formulated: different labels for the immediate neighbors of any node and the existence of exactly one active node.
Hence we can talk in graph terms only. First of all, let us stress that the variety of feasible labels is bounded for any fixed algorithm.
And now, about the active zone. It is, by Kolmogorov's definition, the neighborhood of the active node of some radius, this radius being fixed for any particular algorithm F. The immediate transformation (4-replaces the active zone by 4The active node together with distinction of labels secures for any graph of the kind described the existence of some intrinsic coordinate system such that each node possesses its own coordinate by which it can be identified. In computer science they usually speak about Kolmogorov machines. Computer scientists have less interest than logicians in the foundational problem of whether the general concept of an algorithm can be strictly and appropriately defined. They treat Kolmogorov's formulation as a description of some computing device whose storage (which they often call "tape") can change its topology. The advantage of this device from a computer scientist's point of view is that it gives a good measure of time complexity and allows one to prove nice theorems about this measure. That things differ not only in size but also in complexity is obvious. But Kolmogorov was the first who tried to measure the complexity of a thing numerically, by a number. His idea is very simple and reduces the notion of complexity of an object to the notion of size, though not of the object itself but of some description of that object. So there are objects and there are descriptions. An object is complex if all its descriptions are large, and it is simple if at least one of its description is small. Hence it is natural to define the complexity of an object as the minimal size of a description of this object.
There are, of course, many modes of description, and each mode leads to its own particular complexity measure. So one needs to choose a good mode of description to obtain a good complexity measure. The less the value of complexity for all the objects, the better is the description mode. But there is no mode that gives the least possible complexity for every object. So it is necessary to invent a reasonable method of comparison of description modes, i.e. to invent a reasonable ordering on the variety of modes. Such a method does exist: let us say that one mode is no worse than a second mode if the complexity related to the first mode is less than the complexity related to the second, up to an additive constant.
Then there is a so-called optimal mode of description which is the best with respect to the ordering just defined; in fact, there are many such optimal modes. The complexity, related to any optimal mode, of an object is "the true complexity" of the object. So there are many "true complexities" of the same object, but any two of them differ less than by a constant, with the constant depending not on the object but only on two corresponding optimal modes.
As to what a mode of description is, it is a function S from the set N of natural numbers, these numbers serving as descriptions, to a set D whose elements serve as objects. The objects under consideration are constructive objects. The descriptions are constructive objects, too. So we can encode objects and descriptions by finite binary words and then identify the encoded entities with their codes. Thus we transfer from objects and descriptions of arbitrary nature to binary words. The set of all (finite) binary words is denoted by 3. Any mode of description is a set E c3 x E; if <p, y> E E, then p is a description of y in the mode E.
The complexity KE(y) of y with respect to E is defined as KE(y) = min{l(p) I <p, y> E El, where l(p) is the length of the word p; as usual, KE(y) = oc if there is no p such that <p,y> E E. Let E and F be two modes of description. We say that the mode E is no worse than F if for some constant C not depending on y and for every y E E KE(y) < KF(Y) + C.
Finally, let 9I be a class of modes. A mode A E 9 is called optimal with respect to W if it is no worse than any F Ec W. The complexity related to any optimal mode of description is called entropy.
From now on (this is important!) only enumerable (i.e. recursively enumerable) modes of description will be considered.
We say a mode of description E preserves equality if To form a due appreciation of Kolmogorov's role in founding complexity theory let us try to trace the main aspects of his definition of entropy:
1. Kolmogorov's definition suggested the first means to measure the complexity of an object numerically.
2. This definition serves as the basis for the algorithmic theory of information (see Part II of this essay).
3. It opens a way to other versions of complexity measure which were introduced later by his student Levin and turned out to be essential for the algorithmic theory of probability. PART III.
APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY OF ALGORITHMS TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND INFORMATION THEORY
Kolmogorov did not personally work on applications of algorithm theory to computer science. However, he took ap interest in these applications and expressed the opinion that mathematical logic (including the theory of algorithms) and computer science must develop in close contact. He was even ready to rename the Department of Mathematical Logic, which he chaired, the Department of Mathematical Logic and Informatics. But personally he was concerned with building bridges from the abstract theory of algorithms not to computer science but to two other applied branches of mathematics-probability theory and information theory.
It is well known that Kolmogorov is one of the founding fathers of contemporary probability theory. As was usual for him, he was interested first of all in the essence of the things. He wanted to know the very nature of probability and randomness. And in one of his last talks (at the fourth USSR-Japan symposium, Tbilisi, 1982) he said: "There emerges the problem of finding the reasons for the applicability of the mathematical theory of probability to the phenomena of the real world. (...) Since randomness is defined as absence of regularity, we should primarily specify the concept of regularity. The natural means of such a specification is the theory of algorithms and recursive functions; the first attempt at its application in probability theory was that made by Church To briefly summarize von Mises' ideas let us confine ourselves to the two-letter alphabet of symbols {0, 1} and let us consider an infinite sequence of zeros and ones. Does it make sense to assert that the sequence is random with respect to the Bernoulli distribution with p and q as probabilities of zero and of one? Von Mises believed that the sequence must be recognized as random if every legitimate subsequence of it has the property of stability of frequencies. We say that a binary sequence possesses the property of frequency stability with limit p if lim(Vn/n) = p, n -+ ox, where Vn is the number of zeros in the initial segment of length n. By von Mises' definition, a binary sequence is random (with respect to p and q) if every suitably, or admissibly, chosen subsequence of it has frequency stability with limit p.
The Church required the existence of an algorithm that could determine whether or not to select the term as depending on the values of the preceding terms ao, a1,. . ., as1 of the considered sequence. Thus the domain of this algorithm is the set S of all binary words, and the range is the two-element set {Yes,No}. The algorithm operates as follows. Let the sequence being considered be a0a1a2 , and suppose that its initial segment a0a1 ... as_ 1 has been admitted as the input to the algorithm. Then if "Yes" results at the output, the term as must be chosen for inclusion in the subsequence being generated; but if "No" is the output, then as is passed over. The computable function (p: E -+ {Yes, No}, defined by this algorithm, is uniquely determined by the set {X I p(X) = Yes}. Therefore, in order to specify a Church admissible selection rule, it suffices to designate some decidable set D c H and then to put q(px) = "Yes" if x E D and q(px) = "No" if x E -\D.
Church's precise formulation is perhaps the closest to von Mises' original concept. It does not allow one to form a subsequence by selecting those terms whose successors are equal to one, and it is unclear whether von Mises would permit such a subsequence. The matter is that von Mises considered alternation of sequence members as a process going on in real physical time, like flipping a coin. It is obvious, however, that the particular subsequence just mentioned also must possess the property of frequency stability provided the entire sequence is random. But this observation still does not lead to a direct contradiction between Church's definition and the traditional idea of randomness.
Such a contradiction was obtained later when it was discovered that Church random sequences can violate some laws of probability theory ( Thus the main feature of Kolmogorov's definition is that the requirement (1) has been discarded and the terms of the sequence are allowed to proceed in a new order.
To avoid any vagueness, let us note that the algorithm occurring in the above quotation from [ANK 82] need not converge totally, for all instances of input information; if the algorithm diverges, i.e. has no output, the selection procedure stops and the subsequence turns out to be finite; in this case there is no frequency stability requirement for this subsequence (the same absence of the frequency stability requirement holds in the case when a Church admissible selection rule gives a finite subsequence And now we move to the main contribution of Kolmogorov to the algorithmic theory of probability. That is the concept of chaoticness. Though Kolmogorov personally was not fully successful in the ultimate formalization of this concept, he suggested the basic ideas for such a formalization. In 1971-72 Kolmogorov's design was fulfilled by his student Leonid Levin, and then independently by Claus Peter Schnorr.
To make our presentation more clear and to avoid any confusion of concepts and terms, let us distinguish between the general intuitive notion of random sequence and the no less intuitive notions of a stochastic sequence and a chaotic sequence. The term "stochastic" was proposed by Kolmogorov for Mises random sequences: to be stochastic means that the sequence and all admissibly selected subsequences of it possess the property of frequency stability. The term "chaotic" was approved by Kolmogorov; being chaotic means that the sequence demonstrates an absence of regularity, that there is no simple law governing the alternation of its terms. And it is generally accepted that every random sequence is both stochastic and chaotic. So the sequences that are random in von Mises', Church's and Kolmogorov's sense should be called respectively "stochastic", "Church stochastic" and "Kolmogorov stochastic".
Let us proceed to chaoticness. This concept, though not in its final details, was suggested by Kolmogorov to his students in the sixties. I believe these ideas were presented also in Kolmogorov Up to now we have spoken only of randomness with respect to the uniform Bernoulli distribution where p = q = '. Generalization to arbitrary p and q (provided they are computable reals) is obvious. And a further generalization is also possible, to arbitrary computable probability distributions; the equivalence of being chaotic to being typical remains valid.
Though the simple Kolmogorov entropy turned out to be somewhat inadequate to define randomness, this notion much facilitated the development of the algorithmic theory of information. Indeed, the conditional Kolmogorov entropy (which is nothing but a conditional version of the simple Kolmogorov entropy) served as the cornerstone in founding this theory. And this founding was performed by Kolmogorov 
I(x: y) + H(y Ix) = H(y), where e is an "a priori known object". In the traditional probabilistic theory of information both objects x and y are random variables; in the algorithmic theory of information they are constructive objects. The immediate tasks of the algorithmic version of the theory are:
10. to check whether basic formulae holding in the probabilistic case remain valid in the algorithmic case, and 2?. to establish relations between the two versions, algorithmic and probabilistic, of information theory quantities, especially entropy.
As to the first task, let us recall that in the probabilistic case, which is explored well enough, the following formulae are valid: "The algorithmic approach is based on using the theory of algorithms to define the notion of entropy, or complexity, of a finite object and the notion of the information in a finite object about another one. An intuitive difference between "simple" and "complex" objects was felt, apparently, for a long time. On the way to a formalization of this difference, an obvious difficulty arises: what has a simple description in one language, may have no simple description in another language; and it is not clear which mode of description should be chosen. The main discovery, due to R. Solomonoff and myself, is the following: with the aid of the theory of algorithms it is possible to restrict this arbitrary choice and to define the complexity almost invariantly (the replacement of one mode of description by another leads merely to the adding of a bounded summand). 
